Abstract. We propose a non-interactive zero knowledge pairwise multiset sum equality test (PMSET) argument in the common reference string (CRS) model that allows a prover to show that the given committed multisets Aj for j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} satisfy A1 A2 = A3 A4, i.e., every element is contained in A1 and A2 exactly as many times as in A3 and A4. As a corollary to the PMSET argument, we present arguments that enable to efficiently verify the correctness of various (multi)set operations, for example, that one committed set is the intersection or union of two other committed sets. The new arguments have constant communication and verification complexity (in group elements and group operations, respectively), whereas the CRS length and the prover's computational complexity are both proportional to the cardinality of the (multi)sets. We show that one can shorten the CRS length at the cost of a small increase of the communication and the verifier's computation.
Introduction
One of the most common tasks undertaken to achieve active security (i.e., security against malicious participants) in various cryptographic protocols is to construct an efficient zero knowledge proof that the committed (or encrypted) messages sent by various parties belong to correct sets. For example, some of the most efficient e-voting protocols [15, 17] and e-auction protocols [38] are secure only if the voters (resp., bidders) have committed to inputs from a certain range. Because of such reasons, range proofs -where the prover aims to convince the verifier that the committed message belongs to some public range -have been widely studied in cryptographic literature. There are many well-known efficient range proofs, both interactive [9, 38, 35, 10, 13] and non-interactive [42, 14, 21] .
However, in many applications it is not sufficient to prove that the inputs belong to a continuous range, since the valid input set may be an arbitrary (polynomial-size) set of integers. Moreover, often the same party has to commit to related inputs many times, and the whole protocol is secure only if the committed input sets satisfy some set-theoretic relations. E.g., in an approval e-voting protocol, one could first to be asked to commit to a set A of all approved candidates, and in the second round (based on the outcome of the first round) to a certain subset B of A. One could interpret A and B as multisets, where a voter is allowed to distribute a limited number of points between the set of all candidates. To achieve active security, the voter must prove in particular that B ⊆ A ⊆ U, where U is the set of all candidates. Moreover, in any concrete application, it can also be required to lower and upper bound the cardinality of A and B. For instance, in the case of approval voting, the voter may only have a number of votes to spend, but may be required to vote at least once. Similarly, in a combinatorial auction, a bidder may bid up to a certain number items, but might be required to bid at least once to continue in the next round.
Similar issues arise in many other applications, and thus a lot of work has been done in constructing efficient zero knowledge proofs for (multi)set-theoretic operations. However, practically all existing (multi)settheoretic zero knowledge proofs [19, 33, 31] require at least linear communication in the size of the committed sets. This is not acceptable in many applications where the cardinality of the underlying sets is large. See Table 1 for a brief comparison, and App. A for a longer comparison. (App. A also compares the current work with [32] .)
First eprint version, January 3, 2014 Paper Operation RO |CRS| Prov comp Ver comp Comm [32] zero-knowledge sets yes Θ(k) Θ(k) Θ(1) Θ(1) [19] committed subset of disjoint sets yes -Ω(k) Ω(k) Ω(k) [33] set intersection, set union yes -O(k) O(k) O(k) [31] set intersection yes Θ(1) Θ(k) Θ(k) Θ(k) This paper PMSET, committed subset, set intersection, set union, set difference, zeroknowledge sets, accumulator, . . . Moreover, all existing efficient set-theoretic zero-knowledge proofs are interactive, which makes them less useful in practice. While they can be made non-interactive in the random oracle model by using the FiatShamir heuristic [22] , it is well-known that such a heuristic is not a proof [12, 26] . Thus, a better approach is to build non-interactive zero knowledge (NIZK) proofs in the common reference string (CRS) model. See Sect. 2 for more preliminaries on NIZK proofs and arguments (i.e., computationally sound proofs). For the rest of this introduction, we recall that sublinear NIZK proofs can only be (a) computationally sound, and (b) cannot be based on standard (falsifiable) assumptions [25] . Thus, following a long line of contemporary cryptographic research [28, 14, 36, 24, 5, 3, 21 ,37], we will construct NIZK arguments that are sound under some knowledge assumptions.
Our Contibutions. We tackle the task of constructing efficient (multi)set-theoretic NIZK arguments in a modular way. First, we design an efficient pairing-based NIZK argument for a certain multiset relation. Second, we show that the proposed argument can be used to construct efficient NIZK arguments for a plethora of other (multi)set relations.
More precisely, recall that if A is a multiset, then every element a of the universe U belongs to A with some multiplicity 1 A (a) ≥ 0. (Multiplicity 0 means that a does not belong to A.) In particular, A 1 A 2 is a multiset that has as many copies of any element a as A 1 and A 2 put together, 1 A1 A2 (a) = 1 A1 (a) + 1 A2 (a) for each a ∈ U. See Sect. 2 for more preliminaries on multisets.
We propose a non-interactive pairwise multiset sum equality test (PMSET) argument, where the prover has committed to four multisets A 1 , A 2 , A 3 and A 4 , and aims to prove in zero knowledge that A 1 A 2 = A 3 A 4 . That is, for all a ∈ U, 1 A1 (a) + 1 A2 (a) = 1 A3 (a) + 1 A4 (a). Moreover, for some public constants k j , this argument guarantees the verifier that |A j | ≤ k j .
Briefly, the intuition behind our new PMSET argument is as follows. The prover first commits to a succinct encoding of each A j . More precisely, A j ⊂ Z p is encoded as χ Aj (σ), where χ Aj (X) := a∈Aj (X − a) (with correct multiplicities), and σ is a secret key. The prover commits to χ Aj (σ) for j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. After that, the prover creates a succinct NIZK argument that χ A1 (σ)χ A2 (σ) = χ A3 (σ)χ A4 (σ), where χ Aj (X) is a degree ≤ k j polynomial. The real argument is more complicated, since it has to include several extra values to allow for both the soundness and the zero knowledge part of the security proof to go through:
(i) to achieve computational soundness, every group element in the argument is accompanied by a knowledge component, (ii) to achieve zero knowledge, the argument contains independent random commitments D j to all 4 multisets A j . In the simulation, the simulator sets D j to be equal to random group elements, and simulates the NIZK arguments that D j commit to the original sets A j . (See Sect. 4 for details.) The argument can be verified by using a small number of computations of a bilinear map.
By relying on suitable cryptographic hardness assumptions, from a successful verification it follows that χ A1 (X)χ A2 (X) = χ A3 (X)χ A4 (X), and thus the two polynomials χ A1 (X)χ A2 (X) and χ A3 (X)χ A4 (X) have the same set of roots with the same multiplicities. Thus, if the PMSET argument verifies, then the verifier is convinced that the prover knows multisets A j , such that A 1 A 2 = A 3 A 4 . Moreover, since χ Aj (X) is a degree ≤ k j polynomial, the verifier is also convinced that |A j | ≤ k j .
We actually work in a relaxation of the described model, by allowing χ Aj (X) to be any polynomial that has A j as its null set (again, with correct multiplicities). This somewhat simplifies the argument. Moreover, it allows us to specify parameters k j such that the prover can additionally convince the verifier that the cardinality of A j is not larger than k j . Thus, we automatically achieve the size-hiding property, required (in particular) in the case of zero-knowledge sets [39] . On the other hand, we can use the upper bound on |A j | to guarantee, for example, that a voter has approved at most k j candidates. Without the mentioned relaxation, it seems that the cardinality of A j would have to be exactly equal to k j , where k j is fixed during the CRS generation.
The length of the new argument is Θ(1) group elements, while the verifier's computation is dominated by Θ(1) cryptographic pairings. As a drawback, the CRS length is Θ(k * ), where k * = max j k j , and the prover's computational complexity is dominated by several k * -wide bilinear-group multiexponentiations. Although multiexponentiations can be optimized by using the algorithms of Straus [43] and Pippenger [41] , they are still costly.
We also provide a version of the PMSET argument that has a smaller CRS length but larger communication and verifier's computation. In the balanced version, all these parameters have complexity Θ( √ k). (The prover's computation is still linear in k -this seems, although we are not claiming it, to be necessary unless A j have a specific structure that one can exploit.)
Applications. We finish the paper by showing how to use the PMSET argument to prove the correct execution of several (multi)set operations. Many applications are possible since any of the multisets A j can be either public (e.g., in some applications we can choose A j = ∅ to be public) or committed to, and that we are given flexibility of choosing the values k j for committed multisets. For example, we obtain arguments for
As another example, we can prove that A 1 is a multiset obtained from A 2 by increasing or decreasing the multiplicity of exactly one (public or committed) element by one. If that element is public, we obtain a dynamic accumulator [11] .
Finally, we mention that one can construct a zap (two-message witness-indistinguishable argument, where the verifier's first message can be shared between many protocol executions, [20] ) from the new NIZK argument by using standard techniques: basically, the verifier creates the CRS, and the prover then replies with the NIZK argument. Such a zap is secure in the standard model, without assuming the existence of a trusted third party who creates the CRS.
Preliminaries
Notation. Sets are denoted by blackboard bold uppercase letters as in A. By deg(f ), we denote the degree of the polynomial f . If h = g x in a group G, then we write x = log g h. For a group G, we utilize the fact that G 2 = G × G is a group and thus aggressively use notation like (g, h) a or (g 1 , h 1 ) · (g 2 , h 2 ). Let NUPPT stand for non-uniform probabilistic polynomial time. A positive function ε(·) is negligible in its parameter if it decreases faster than the inverse of any polynomial, i.e., ε(n) = n −ω (1) . By κ, we denote the security parameter.
Sets And Multisets. Formally, a multiset is a 2-tuple (A, µ A ) where A is some set and µ A : A → N ≥1 is a function from A to the set N ≥1 = {1, 2, 3, . . . } of positive natural numbers. The set A is called the underlying set of elements. For each a in A the multiplicity of a is the number µ A (a). If A ⊆ U for some larger set U, then one can extend µ A to U, by defining µ A (a) = 0 for a ∈ A. We denote this extended multiplicity function by 1 A , and assume its existence implicitly, talking about a multiset A instead of a multiset (A, 1 A ).
If A and B are sets, then 1 A (a) = 1 if a ∈ A and 1 A (a) = 0 if x ∈ A. If A and B are sets, then
The cardinality of a finite (multi)set A is |A| = a∈U 1 A (a). Now, assume that A and B are multisets. The multiset sum A B is defined so that 1 A B (i) = 1 A (i)+1 B (i) for all i, and the multiset difference A \ B is defined so that 1 A\B (i) = max(0, 1 A (i) − 1 B (i)) for all i. In most of the cases, we just use common set-theoretic operations with multisets. For example, a ∈ A means that 1 A (a) ≥ 1.
Bilinear Groups. Let G bp (1 κ ) be a bilinear group generator that outputs a description of a bilinear group
Deciding the membership in G 1 , G 2 and G T , group operations, the pairingê, and sampling the generators are efficient, and the descriptions of the groups and group elements are O(κ)-bit long each. A cryptographic pairing is also required to satisfy some hardness assumptions (see later in this section).
Well-chosen asymmetric pairings (with no efficient isomorphism between G 1 and G 2 ) are much more efficient than symmetric pairings (where G 1 = G 2 ). For κ = 128, the current recommendation is to use an optimal (asymmetric) Ate pairing [30] over a subclass of Barreto-Naehrig curves [2, 40] . In that case, at security level of κ = 128, an element of G 1 /G 2 /G T can be represented in respectively 512/256/3072 bits.
(Λ, u) Trapdoor Commitment Scheme. A trapdoor commitment scheme is a randomized cryptographic primitive (in the common reference string model [8] ) that takes a message and outputs a commitment and a trapdoor. It is required to have the following three security properties.
Computational binding: without access to the trapdoor, it is intractable to open the same commitment to two different messages. Perfect hiding: the commitments of any two messages have the same distribution. Trapdoor: given an access to the original message, the randomizer and the trapdoor, one can open the commitment to an arbitrary message.
Let z ∈ {1, 2}. Assume that k > 0 and u ∈ [0, k] are public parameters. Let
We use the following ([0, k], u) trapdoor commitment scheme from [21] . For parm ← G bp (1 κ ), g z ← r G z \ {1} and the trapdoor (σ, α) ← Z 2 p (with σ = 0), let the common reference string be
The commmon reference string ck is made public, while the trapdoor (σ, α) is only used in security proofs. Define
. 3 Here and in what follows, elements of the form (g, g α ) x , where α is a secret random key, can be thought of as a linear-only encoding of x, see [5] for a discussion
The computation of com can be sped up by using efficient multi-exponentiations algorithms [43, 41] . Groth [28] and Lipmaa [36] used a similar trapdoor commitment scheme, but with u = 0. (See also [27] .) In our arguments, the case of an arbitrary u is more suitable, though we can also modify them to work in the case u = 0.
Let Λ ⊆ Z p . A bilinear group generator G bp is Λ-PSDL (power symmetric discrete logarithm) secure [36] , if for any NUPPT adversary A, the following probability is negligible in κ:
For algorithms A and X A , we write (y; y X ) ← (A||X A )(σ) if A on input σ outputs y, and X A on the same input (including the random tape of A) outputs y X . Let z ∈ {1, 2}. Let Λ ⊂ Z p . G bp is Λ-PKE (power knowledge of exponent) secure [28, 36] in G z if for any NUPPT A there exists an NUPPT extractor X A , such that the following probability is negligible in κ:
As shown in [21] , the ([0, k], u) trapdoor commitment scheme is perfectly hiding, and computationally binding under the Ψ k,u -PSDL assumption. Moreover, if the Ψ k,u -PKE assumption holds, then for any NUPPT A that outputs a valid commitment C, there exists a NUPPT extractor that, given A's input together with A's random coins, extracts a valid opening of C.
Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge (NIZK). NIZK proofs [8] allow the prover to convince the verifier that some input x belongs to some NP language L in the manner that nothing else expect the truth of the statement is revealed. It is well-known that NIZK proofs do not exist without trusted setups unless P = NP. There are two popular approaches to deal with this. The first approach, the use of random oracle model, results often in very efficient protocols. It is well known [12, 26] that some protocols that are secure in the random oracle model are non-instantiable in the standard model, and thus the random oracle model is a heuristic at its best.
A better approach is to construct NIZK proofs in the common reference string (CRS) model [8] . Many verifiers can then later independently verify the proof, by having access to the same CRS. The proof has to be complete, sound and satisfy the zero-knowledge property. In practice, one is interested in proofs where both the proof length and verification time are sublinear in the statement size. Such succinct proofs cannot be statistically sound, and their soundness cannot be proven under falsifiable assumptions [25] . The latter means that one has to employ knowledge assumptions [16] . A computationally sound proof is also known as an argument. Succinct NIZK arguments have been proposed for languages like Circuit-SAT [28, 36, 24, 3, 37] , Range [14, 21] , Set Partition, Subset Sum and Decision Knapsack [21] . While several of these arguments are efficient, they are all highly technical, and based on a careful combination of already complex basic arguments.
More formally, an NIZK argument for a language L consists of three algorithms, Gen crs , Pro and Ver. The CRS generation algorithm Gen crs takes as input 1 κ (and possibly some other, public, language-dependent information) and outputs the prover's CRS crs p , the verifier's CRS crs v , and the trapdoor td. (The distinction between crs p and crs v is not important for security, but in many applications crs v is much shorter.) The prover's algorithm Pro takes as an input crs p together with a statement x and a witness w, and outputs an argument π. The verifier's algorithm Ver takes as an input crs v together with a statement x and an argument π, and either accepts or rejects.
We expect the argument to be (i) perfectly complete (the honest verifier always accepts the honest prover), (ii) perfectly zero knowledge (there exists an efficient simulator who can, given x, crs p and td, output an argument that comes from the same distribution as the argument produced by the prover), and (iii) computationally sound (if x ∈ L, then an arbitrary NUPPT prover has only a negligible success in creating a satisfying argument). We refer to say [28, 36] for formal definitions.
New Succinct Trapdoor Multiset Commitment Scheme
To succinctly commit to a multiset A, we represent A as a null set (with multiplicities) of a polynomial. For a multiset A ⊂ Z p , let
where every a has been counted with its multiplicity. For example, χ {1,1,2} (X) = (X − 1) 2 (X − 2). Let z ∈ {1, 2}, and let k = |A| (recall that |A| includes the multiplicities of all elements) and u ∈ [0, k] be again public parameters. To commit to a multiset A, we use the ([0, k], u) trapdoor commitment scheme from [21] . Again, we first choose parm ← G bp (1 κ ) and α, σ ← r Z p , and then set
to be the common reference string. We then define
More precisely, the committer assumes that χ A (X) = k i=0 s i X i for some coefficients s i , and then computes
for r ← r Z p . The trapdoor is equal to td ← (α, σ).
Theorem 1. Suppose z ∈ {1, 2}. The described trapdoor multiset commitment scheme is hiding and, under the Ψ k,u -PSDL assumption, computationally binding. If the Ψ k,u -PKE assumption holds in G z , then one can also extract the contents of the commitment.
Proof. The proof follows [21] . Perfect Hiding: follows from the fact that if r is uniformly random in Z p , then g
is a uniformly random element of G z and thus does not depend on A. Computational Binding: assume that an adversary can efficiently produce (s 1 , . . . , s k ; r) and (s 1 , . . . , s k ; r ) with s i = s i for some i, such that
is a non-zero polynomial such that d(σ) = 0. By using efficient polynomial factorization [34] , we can find all possible roots of d, and then find σ by comparing for each root x the value g x z with the given g σ z in ck.
Trapdoor: given td, ck, (A, r), (C, C ) = com ck (A; r) and A , one can compute r such that (C, C ) = com ck (A ; r ) by using the fact that
Extraction: follows straightforwardly from the Ψ k,u -PKE assumption.
New Pairwise Multiset Sum Equality Test Argument
In a pairwise multiset sum equality test (PMSET) argument, the prover aims to convince the prover, that he knows how to open given four commitments C j to four multisets A j , for j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, such that A 1 A 2 = A 3 A 4 , where in both sides, the multiplicities of all elements are summed up. That is, we have
In addition to that, one can also upperbound |A j | by some public value k j . The intuition of the new PMSET argument is as follows. The prover commits to A j , for j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, by using the multiset commitment scheme of Sect. 3. After that, the prover creates a short NIZK argument to show that
If one does not randomize the commitments, the use of the trapdoor commitment scheme from [21] makes the corresponding NIZK argument relatively (but not completely) straightforward. To take into account the fact that the commitment scheme is randomized, we let the prover also to create a crib E that enables the verifier to verify Eq. (1) on committed elements. Moreover, due to technical reasons, the prover also has to add extra elements (D j , ∆ j ), j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, to the argument. These elements make it possible for the simulator to simulate the NIZK argument, and are necessary since the commitments C j are a part of the statement (i.e., the input of the prover) and not a part of the NIZK argument. Here, D j is basically an alternative random commitment to A j , while ∆ j is an element that makes it possible to verify that D j was created correctly. In the simulation, D j are chosen uniformly and at random, and ∆ j will be set so that the verification still accepts. Such a design also increases the compatibility of our argument; namely the four multisets to be proven can be arbitrarily committed in either G 1 or G 2 . This allows the prover to freely compose our arguments for some complex (multi)set relations. Without loss of generality, in the remaining of this section, we assume that all the commitments in the statement are in G 1 .
Thus, in the new argument, the prover creates new random commitments D j to A j for j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, together with ∆ j and the crib E. Since we will use a knowledge assumption, all elements have an accompanying knowledge component.
By relying on suitable assumptions, from Eq. (1) we obtain that χ A1 (X)χ A2 (X) = χ A3 (X)χ A4 (X), and thus in particular χ A1 (X)χ A2 (X) and χ A3 (X)χ A4 (X) have the same roots with the same multiplicities. Therefore, the verifier is convinced that A 1 A 2 = A 3 A 4 (and due to the use of a knowledge assumption, that the prover actually knows all four multisets).
We relax the multiset commitment scheme of Sect. 3 slightly, by allowing χ Aj (X) to be any polynomial that has A j as its null set (with correct multiplicities). This relaxation allows us to achieve the following property. Recall that the cardinality of a multiset counts the multiplicities of its elements, |A| = a 1 A (a) = deg χ A (X). In the new PMSET argument, one sets an upper bound k j to the cardinality of the multiset A j , |A j | ≤ k j , before creating the CRS. Hence, χ Aj (X) = kj i=0 s ji X i for some coefficients s ji . As we will see later, setting different k j to related values makes it possible to design interesting variations of the PMSET argument.
We do not know how to achieve such flexibility without the relaxation of the previous paragraph: without it, the committed polynomial χ Aj has to be monic, and thus in the committed subset argument one has to check that a specific coefficient of χ Aj is equal to 1. This would mean that the cardinality of A j has to be known before even creating the CRS. In our case, one just has an upper bound on |A j |, and thus our arguments are size-hiding which allows to build zero-knowledge sets [39] .
We note that we have another complication. We divide the commitment scheme into two partial commitment schemes as follows (com . Note that most of the elements g j i that are used by the prover or the verifier include a secret component in their exponent and thus they are computed based on the elements that are a part of the CRS. To avoid filling the variable namespace, we will not assign special variable names for all those elements.
CRS generation Gen
For j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}: Let z = 1 if j ∈ {1, 3} and z = 2 if j ∈ {2, 4}; Set
Verify that C j and D j commit to the same multisets:
Theorem 2. The argument of the current subsection is a perfectly complete and perfectly zero-knowledge argument that the prover knows how to open C j as a multiset A j for j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, such that
. Moreover: -If the Ψ k * ,u,2u -PSDL, the Ψ k1,u -PKE and Ψ k3,u -PKE assumption in G 1 , the Ψ k2,u -PKE and the Ψ k4,u -PKE and the ([u, u + k * ] ∪ {2u})-PKE assumption in G 2 hold, then it is computationally sound.
-If the Ψ k1,u -PKE assumption and the Ψ k3,u -PKE assumption hold in G 1 and the Ψ k2,u -PKE assumption and the Ψ k4,u -PKE assumption hold in G 2 , then it is an argument of knowledge.
We remark that to simplify the claim, one can combine the the different PKE assumptions into one (stronger than necessary) PKE assumption, but we preferred to state precise assumptions. For example, (Ψ 1 ∪Ψ 2 )-PKE implies both Ψ 1 -PKE and Ψ 2 -PKE, but the opposite direction does not necessarily hold.
Proof. Let h =ê(g 1 , g 2 ). Completeness: It is easy to see that if the prover is honest, then all the equations but the last one hold. For the very last equation, note that since (
and analogously
Thus,
Zero-Knowledge: In the real execution, the variables C j , D j , ∆ j , and E are distributed randomly, modulo the last verification equation. Moreover, C j , D j , ∆ j , and E are such that the verification equations on line (a) hold.
The simulator, who knows td but does not know the witness, will simulate the proof as follows.
for j ∈ {2, 4}. 3. Choose E so that the last verification equation holds, that is,
, and E ← E η . Such a choice satisfies the verification equations on line (a).
Since all verifications are satisfied and π comes from the correct distribution, then the simulation has been successful and the argument is perfect zero-knowledge.
Computational soundness: Assume that an adversary A can break the soundness assumption. We construct another adversary A psdl that breaks the Ψ k * ,u,2u -PSDL assumption as follows.
Assume that all the required knowledge assumptions hold. Therefore, we can extract the following values: -For j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, by the Ψ kj ,u -PKE assumption in G 1 , from (C j , C j ) the adversary obtains a polynomial
. -For j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, by the {0}-PKE assumption in G 2 , from (∆ j , ∆ j ) the adversary obtains δ j such that
(Note that the {0}-PKE assumption follows from the Ψ kj ,u -PKE assumption.) -For j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}: let z = 1 for j ∈ {1, 3} and z = 2 for j ∈ {2, 4}. By the Ψ kj ,u -PKE assumption in G z ,
If any extraction does not succeed, then A psdl aborts (this happens with a negligible probability). Assume now that A psdl does not abort.
Since
) holds, we have
Therefore, if for some i, j, s ji = s ji or δ j = t j − r j we have a non-zero polynomial
such that d(σ) = 0. Note that σ = 0, so A psdl uses an efficient polynomial factorization algorithm [34] to find all roots of d(X), and then tests for which root x it holds that (say) g
Thus, A psdl has found σ and broken the Ψ k * ,u -PSDL assumption (and thus also the Ψ k * ,u,2u -PSDL assumption).
Analogously, A psdl can break the Ψ k * ,u -PSDL assumption if for some i, s ji = s ji or δ j = t j − r j in the case j ∈ {2, 4}.
Assuming that the adversary did not already break the Ψ k * ,u -PSDL assumption, we now have that for all j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, (D j , D j ) and (C j , C j ) commit to the same set, let it be A j .
Finally, due to the last verification equation, we havê
This means that, defining
for some coefficients c i and c , we have d(σ) = 0. Since A succeeded in cheating, it must be the case that d(X) is a non-zero polynomial. But in this case, A psdl has obtained a non-zero polynomial d(X) where d(σ) = 0 for some unknown σ. A psdl uses an efficient polynomial factorization algorithm [34] to find all roots of d(X), and then tests for which root x it holds that (say) g Clearly, the communication complexity of this argument is Θ(1) group elements and the verifier's computational complexity is dominated by Θ(1) pairings. The verifier's CRS length contains the parameters parm and Θ(1) group elements. On the other hand, the prover's CRS length, the CRS computation, and the prover's computation are Θ(k) group elements or operations respectively. Once again, the computation can be sped up by using efficient multi-exponentiation algorithms [43, 41] .
Balancing. One can design a balanced version of the new subset argument as follows. Let k = |A 1 A 2 |. Partition both A 1 and A 2 into ≈ √ k subsets A 1i and A 2i , so that |A 1i A 2i | ≈ √ k. Partition A 3 and A 4 in a similar way, so that A 1i A 2i = A 3i A 4i . Now, the PMSET argument that A 1 A 2 = A 3 A 4 is just equal to the concatenation of √ k PMSET arguments that A 1i A 2i = A 3i A 4i . Clearly, in this balanced version, the CRS length, the verifier's computation, and the communication are Θ( √ k), that is, sublinear in k. On the other hand, the prover's computational complexity is still Θ(k). However, Θ(k) total work is clearly a lower bound for arbitrary sets A j .
Applications
Next, we show how to apply the new PMSET argument to construct arguments for standard (multi)set operations, such as intersections, unions, and complements. In such arguments, the prover wants to convince the verifier that its three committed (multi)sets A, B, C satisfy relations like A ⊆ B, A = B ∩ C, A = B ∪ C or A = B \ C. We first note that one can clearly modify the PMSET argument so that to allow any subset of {A, B, C, D} to be publicly known sets (e.g., C = ∅). This just means that canonical commitments of the public sets are included to the CRS. One has to obviously take care about including only the correct knowledge components to the CRS, but we omit further discussion because of the lack of space.
In what follows, let U be some publicly known universal set. For efficiency reasons, it is required that U is not too large; this is usually not a too restrictive assumption. In fact, in many cases U has been fixed by the application and one has to verify among other things that all sets belong to U. E.g., in the case of e-voting, U can be the set of all candidates, and in the case of e-auctions, U can be the set of bids (or in combinatorial auctions, the set of all auctioned goods).
Is-a-Sub(multi)set argument. Clearly, A ⊆ B (i.e., 1 A (a) ≤ 1 B (a) for all a ∈ U) iff A C = ∅ B, for some (committed) multiset C. Thus, the prover simply provides a commitment to C as a part of the is-a-subset argument, and then directly utilizes the PMSET argument.
Is-a-Set argument. A committed multiset A is a set (i.e., 1 A (a) ≤ 1 for all a) if A ⊆ U. Thus, for example to show that A ⊆ B where A and B are both sets, one has to show that A ⊆ B and B ⊆ U by using the argument from the previous paragraph. Note that having an upper bound on |C| effectively enforces an lower bound on |A|. Set-Difference argument. To show that committed sets A, B, C ⊆ U satisfy A = B \ C (i.e., 1 A (a) = max(0, 1 B (a) − 1 C (a)) for all a), the prover shows (by using the set-intersection-and-union argument from the previous paragraph) that A ∩ C = ∅ and A ∪ C = B ∪ C. Since ∅ is not committed to, one can somewhat simplify the resulting argument (e.g., one does not have to verify that ∅ ⊆ A).
Accumulators. We can extend the applications to the case of cryptographic accumulators [4] , where given committed S and a public k, one has to present a short proof of either k ∈ S or k ∈ S. In this case, one is traditionally not interested in privacy, but the proofs should be sound. More precisely, given k ∈ S, we can give a PMSET argument that {k} ∪ S = S for some committed multiset S . Similarly, given k ∈ S, we can give a PMSET argument that {k} ∪ S = U \ S for some committed multiset S . In both cases, one can additionally use an is-a-set argument to show that S (or S , in the k ∈ S case) is a set. This also means that we can implement a dynamic accumulator [11] , by first showing that k ∈ S (or k ∈ S) and then using commitment to S as the accumulator for S \ {k} (resp., commitment to S ∪ {k} as the accumulator for S ∪ {k}).
representations of the two sets. They implement secure set intersection with a fixed and equal size for the client and server sets, using the fact that for random polynomials r, s, χ A r + χ B s = χ A∩B t with t having no roots from the universal set U, except for a negligible probability. However, their protocols have O(k) proof size, prover's computation and verification, with the overhead being a proof of correct polynomial multiplication. Moreover, they also have several operations on encrypted polynomials, such as derivatives to reduce duplicated elements of a multiset. These operations are costly, and we choose not to implement them as they will require a product argument as in [21] .
There are several other results on private set intersections that are not directly comparable to ours. For example, Blanton and Aguiar [6] had more efficient set operations than the work stated above based on efficient parallelized multi-party operations, but it requires n > 2 parties while we focus on two-party protocols. D'Arco et al. [18] showed that unconditionally secure size-hiding set intersection is possible with the help of a trusted third party (TTP), given that the client and server have set cardinality at most k. However, the TTP sends output to the client and server based on their specific sets. This means that even for a fixed server set V, the TTP is required for each new client set. Moreover, their 2-round, O(k)-communication protocol was only secure in the semi-honest model. Extending it to become a protocol secure against malicious adversaries, the proof size (that is dominated by proof of correct encryption for each of k Paillier ciphertexts) will also become O(k).
We summarize in Table 1 . Note that we only include results that either have non-interactive zero knowledge proofs, or can be made non-interactive using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic. None of the work discussed has 1 round (non-interactive), does not require a random oracle and has proof size sublinear in the set cardinality, whereas our set operations have constant-size proof and is secure in the CRS model.
